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Macroeconomic 
policies: in 
search of a 
synthesis 
Daniel M. Schydlowsky* 
This article analyses the evolution of the macroeco-
nomic concepts which have prevailed in Latin Amer-
ica from the 1950s until the present. Two main 
concepts —structuralism and monetarism— have 
kept up an ongoing counterpoint over this period. 
The author analyses the main arguments of both 
currents of opinion and appraises their impact on 
the design of macroeconomic policies ¡n the various 
stages of the region's development. 
Around 1985, a new pragmatism appeared on 
the scene, and the analytical bases of this are exam-
ined in detail. The author concludes that this prag-
matic approach requires a good deal of fine-tuning, 
both as regards the economic and social cost of its 
policies and with respect to the need to overcome 
sectoral differences through economic growth. 
Introduction 
The Latin American macroeconomic experience 
in the last few years has been frustrating. The 
heterodox experiments of Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru and Venezuela have crumbled; orthodox 
stabilization in Bolivia has generated price sta-
bility but also the absence of growth; while the 
returns from Mexico's orthodox-like efforts are 
by no means in yet. Chile is growing steadily, 
with low inflation, but its per capita income is 
barely 3% above the level of 1980 and only 12% 
above the level of 1970. If Chile is the example 
for Latin America as a whole, the implication 
may well be one of a wait of another 10 to 20 
years before any net gain in income is realized. 
Costa Rica could be candidate for a rosy spot: its 
record on inflation and growth in 1986-1987 was 
most encouraging. But despite Costa Rica's 
extraordinary access to foreign aid, inflation was 
substantially up again in 1988 and per capita 
growth was negligible. In addition, were an 
attempt made to replicate Costa Rica's expe-
rience hemisphere-wide, its US$80 per capita 
per year of unrequited capital inflow would 
translate mutatis mutandis, to some US$33 bil-
lion of capital inflow a year, a clear impossibility. 
Hope for a better macroeconomic situation 
in Latin America has to lie in the continued 
learning of policy-makers from past experience 
and from new insight into the way Latin Ameri-
can economies function. Fortunately there has 
never been lack of macroeconomic policy debate 
in the hemisphere. It even appeared briefly in 
the mid-1980s that a consensus on a pragmatic 
Latin American macroeconomic policy was 
emerging. Whether such a consensus will ulti-
mately arise still remains to be seen. In the 
interim, it is worthwhile reviewing the ebb and 
flow of the debate since the post-war years to see 
where it now stands.1 
•Professor in the Department of Economics of the 
University of Boston. 
'Sections I and II draw heavily on Schydlowsky, D.M., "Inter-
dependent Development", Harvard International Review, 
November 1985. 
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I 
Point and counterpoint from the 1950 to the 1980s 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the debate was 
between structuralists and monetarists, and 
became one of. the classics among economic 
debates. The structuralists, drawing largely.on 
insight from experience in the southern cone, of 
the hemisphere (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) 
argued that the development process inexorably 
brought about inflation and balance-of-
payments problems; those were essentially 
symptoms of growth. To try to cure inflation by 
monetary contraction would simply stop growth 
without eliminating the causes of inflation. To 
try to cure bal a nee-of-payments problems by 
devaluation was useless because the relevant 
price elasticities were far too low to make deva-
luation effective. Inflation and balance-of-
payments problems, rather, would eventually 
disappear as a consequence of the development 
process itself, which would in time rebalance the 
economy. In the meantime, one could repress 
inflation somewhat with price controls, but oth-
erwise would have to live with it. The balance^ 
of-payments problem was best resolved by 
tariffs and quantitative controls, which would at 
the same time lead to importrsubsti curing 
growth and thereby gradually cause the problem 
to disappear. Prices, in this view of things, 
served mainly a distributive function; their allo-
cation role was thought to be severely hampered 
by low price elasticities, monopolies, oligopolies 
and other institutional circumstances which 
made markets function in a.manner, very differ-
ent from competitive assumptions. 
Monetarists, on the other hand, drawing 
from established economic theory and viewing 
the world largely from the vantage point of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washing-
ton, argued that, without excess demand, no 
inflation or balance-of-payments problem could 
exist. Excess demand, in turn, was caused by 
excessive government expenditure and loose 
monetary policies. Thus, fiscal discipline was of 
the essence, government expenditure needed to 
be cut back, the printing press correspondingly 
slowed down, and, if necessary, the currency 
devalued to re-established its true international 
parity. 
It will be noticed that the monetarist view is 
I more aggregative, less specific to any particular 
institutional situation and thereby more broadly 
' sweeping. 
By late 1960s and early 1970s, monetarism 
had won the intellectual battle for control of 
macroeconomic policy. The level of technical 
training of government economists was 
! continuously increasing and with it the influence 
of established economic theory. Structuralism,1 
• on the other hand, had not been'able to make a 
' good enough intellectual case. Concurrently, 
central banks acquired mpre influence compared 
to national planning agencies, which had earlier 
1
 flourished with the support of the Alliance for; 
Progress. But while monetarism was Winning 
the ' intellectual debate for macroeconomic 
• policy, .structuralism was capturing the 
development, policy: impor t -subs t i tu t ing 
, industrialization swept the hemisphere. 
The essence of impor t -subs t i tu t ing 
industrialization (ISI) is the furtherance of 
domestic production of as many of the country's 
existing imports as possible. It implies a 
deliberate violation of static comparative 
; advantage on the basis of dynamic arguments 
relating to infant economies and infant industry 
laims, learning by doing, externalities, etc 
Moreover, ISI is asymmetrical with regard to 
industrial growth. It stimulates industry in so far 
as it supplies domestic demand; no comparable 
: export drive is part of the plan. Inward-looking 
industrialization is buttressed by tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions which constitute a de 
facto multiple exchange rate system. Industrial 
labour part ic ipates in the benefits of 
industrialization by an increase in wages, be it 
through expanded unionization or through 
political pressure and legislative action on 
minimum wages and fringe benefits. Increased 
labour migration to the cities follows; new 
migrants cannot be absorbed into organized 
industry and thus a so-called "informal sector" 
a p p e a r s which makes m a r k e t s more 
monopolistically competitive, while incomes are 
determined increasingly by mechanisms which 
in one or another way imply work and income-
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sharing. The investment policy furthers the 
accumulation of capital stock in industry. 
However, there is no concern with the level of 
utilization of real capital stock. Indeed, the 
relative price of machinery and labour, the 
structure of the tax system, the depreciation 
rules, the import licensing, and the natural 
proclivities of entrepreneurs all interact to 
generate very substantial levels of unused 
capacity. 
Growth under IS1 implies that industry 
expands rapidly, well in excess of the rates of 
growth of the primary sectors. But, since indus-
try requires imported raw materials while sel-
ling to the domestic market, it is a 
foreign-exchange-using sector. In turn, foreign 
exchange is supplied only by the primary sector. 
The growth pattern is therefore one in which 
the foreign-exchange-demanding sector is grow-
ing much more rapidly than the foreign-
exchange-supplying sectors. As a result, ISI 
produces balance-of-payments crises due to the 
inconsistent sectoral growth of productive 
capacity which this policy furthers. Too much of 
the country's savings go into the foreign-
exchange-using industrial sector, and too little 
into the foreign-exchange-producing primary 
sectors. This imbalance in the distribution of 
capital stock means that full utilization of exist-
ing capital and labour (internal balance) is 
inconsistent with balance-of-payments equili-
brium (external balance). 
When the structuralist-inspired growth pol-
icy produced balance-of-payments problems, the 
monetarist technocracy responded in the only 
way they knew: by devaluing the currency and 
deflating the economy. The deflation part typi-
cally worked. The price adjustments through 
which the devaluation was to rebalance the econ-
omy typically did not work: the ISI policy had 
succeeded in substantially reducing elasticities 
and removing flexibility from the economic sys-
tem. With deflation being the principal effective 
macro-policy tool, the underlying imbalance 
rooted in the maldistribution of capital stock 
between foreign-exchange-using and foreign-
exchange-generating sectors was not touched. 
Rather, the symptoms of this imbalance were 
being temporarily repressed while the deflation 
lasted. Whenever reflation was undertaken, the 
same problem would reappear. Argentineans 
called this the "stop-go" economy. 
The frustration generated by successive 
stop-go cycles combined with the impact of the 
first oil crisis and some particularly inept ex-
periments in populist macroeconomic policies 
(Perón II, Allende) helped usher in a new 
macroeconomic conception accompanied by a 
new macroeconomic instrument. The 
conception was the new monetarism, which 
basically accepted the structuralist argument of a 
fundamental imbalance in the productive 
structure but which resolved to clean house so 
that markets could in the future work the way 
they should. It was necessary to "get the prices 
right". This would be accomplished by opening 
the economies to imports. The domestic price 
level would be controlled courtesy of East Asian 
exporters and thanks to the law of one price (i.e., 
domestic prices cannot diverge from ceilings set 
by import competition). Domestic economic 
efficiency would be achieved by virtue of the 
"winds of competition", which would also blow 
from East Asia. To this end, the exchange rate 
would be suitably managed while any transitory 
problems that this policy might cause in the 
balance of payments would be dealt with by the 
newly available policy instrument: capital 
inflow. Along with opening the economies to 
import trade, they would also be opened to 
private capital flows. Interest rates would be 
encouraged to rise to a level sufficient to bring in 
world capital in whatever amount was necessary; 
indeed, the proper amount would flow in 
automatically by virtue of the workings of the 
free market. 
The new fashion first appeared, as is usual in 
the economic policies of Latin America, in the 
southern cone; the time was the second half of 
the 1970s. In its original habitat, the new 
monetarism coincided with a turn towards 
authoritarianism. However, the fashion spread 
to other countries with different political 
climates such as Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Venezuela. 
Reality was not kind to the economic policy 
of the new monetarism. Import competition did 
not work quite the way it was supposed to. To 
begin with, it turned out that importing is a 
business that requires know-how and 
commercial connections. Thus, in many 
instances, the first importers were the same 
firms who were marketing the corresponding 
domestic products. That, however, meant non-
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competitive markets. Combined with the 
novelty value of imports, it soon appeared that 
import prices were not setting the ceiling to 
domestic prices, but rather domestic costs were 
setting the floor to the pricing of imports. As 
these import monopolies began to be eroded, the 
pendulum swung to the other side. The novelty 
of owning import goods caught on and spread 
like wildfire, demand shifted massively from the 
purchase of domestically produced goods to the 
purchase of import goods. 
Domestic producers attempted to ride out 
the loss of markets by going into debt. Since the 
capital markets had been opened, money for 
lending was readily available. The interest rate 
on this debt was not initially very high. Part of 
the new monetarism involved pegging the 
exchange rate or having it devalue more slowly 
than the domestic rate of inflation, since other-
wise world prices would not have an anti-
inflationary effect. The by-product was that high 
rates of interest in dollars translated to low or 
negative real rates of interest in local currency. 
Consumers also went into massive debt; the 
financial liberalization meant for many of them 
that they had access to credit for the first time. 
What interest they were charged was secondary 
compared to their previous inability to borrow at 
all (i.e., an infinitely high interest rate), so that 
rates demanded did not seem unreasonable, par-
ticularly when they made it possible to buy 
coveted import goods. The inflow of. foreign 
capital thus fuelled an import boom. The winds 
of competition had become a tornado which 
blew a sizeable part of the industrial sector into 
bankruptcy. At the same time, it inflated a huge 
foreign debt balloon, which was bound to burst 
at some time. 
The foreign debt resulting from the new 
monetarism added to the debt Latin America had 
accumulated from the oil deficits and the oil 
boom (for both oil-importing and oil-exporting 
countries had borrowed generously). When 
interest rates rose in the early 1980s, the balloon 
burst. The Latin American debt crisis had 
arrived. 
In the midst of the scramble to contain the 
fallout from the debt crisis, the new monetarism 
was largely abandoned; most governments 
reverted to old monetarism under the IMF's 
supervision; exchange rates were devalued, fiscal 
expenditure was cut, credit was tightened and 
interest rates were raised. The gross national 
product (GNP) fell in many countries of the 
hemisphere. In Argentina, the fall was 11% 
from 1980 to 1982, in Chile it was 15% from 
1981 to 1983, in Peru it was 12% in 1983 alone, 
etc. Industrial output showed even greater reduc-
tions, particularly in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and 
Peru. Inflation did not fall together with output, 
as the old monetarism might have predicted. 
Instead, it sky-rocketed; Argentina reached an 
inflation of 344% and rising in 1983, Chile's 
inflation went from 9% to 23%, Peru's went 
from 73% to 125%. On the other hand, open 
unemployment went to double digits while 
underemployment was above 25% for the 
labour force. The only positive achievement of 
this incarnation of old monetarism was the 
improvement in the balance of trade which 
resulted from the depression. 
At work in this unravelling of the new 
monetarism seems to have been a combination 
of elements. Nominal wages seemed to reassert 
a fundamental indexation to the price level, even 
though real wages did suffer some erosion. 
Profit rates in turn, seemed to maintain their 
levels, making up in the rate of mark-up any fall 
in volume of sales. Relative prices inside the 
Latin American economies began to deviate 
again from world relative prices, and, thanks to a 
new protectionism, moved closer to their earlier 
"traditional" levels. Fundamental societal forces 
determining the income distribution which had 
been repressed during the period of the new 
monetarist policies were now reasserting them-
selves. When the government, in the pursuit of 
old monetarist policies, administered a price 
shock such as the removal of subsidies or a deva-
luation, all it achieved was to accelerate the infla-
tion; structural rigidities had reasserted 
themselves with a vengeance and were now 
more powerful than ever. 
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II 
The new pragmatism, circa 1985 
The collapse of the new monetarism led to the 
simultaneous appearance in different parts of 
Latin America of an approach to macroeconomic 
management which attempted to combine ele-
ments of earlier views with lessons from expe-
rience in a pragmatic fusion. 
The new approach took from structuralism 
the recognition that history matters and that 
institutions and the structure of the capital stock 
and of production must be taken into account. As 
distinct from the new monetarism, however, it 
did not regard these structures as illegitimate 
and worthy only of being swept away. Rather, it 
declared them legitimate and attempted to enlist 
them in the evolution towards an improved 
future. The hallmark of these policies was prag-
matism; their goal was maximizing the achieve-
ment of the possible. 
On the real side, the new pragmatism started 
from the recognition that the well-nigh intolera-
ble social stress caused by the recessive policies 
of old and new monetarism was unnecessary. 
Since there was idle labour and idle capital stock 
in the economy, production and income could be 
substantially higher. However, such a mobiliza-
tion of idle factors of production would require 
complementary foreign exchange. Thus, a 
proper macroeconomic activation policy 
required taking into account differential import 
requirements. Enter, therefore, selective import 
protection and a new phase of import substitu-
tion. Concurrently, however, and drawing on 
historical experience oí the past, the new prag-
matism emphasized the promotion of non-
traditional exports, trying to convert installed 
capacity and available industrial labour into 
export revenue from industrial goods. Since 
excess capacity was understood to, be spread 
unevenly throughout the economy, and costs of 
production were by no means thought to be 
uniform across sectors, the export policy would 
have to be selective, just like the import-
substitution policy. The result would be an 
exchange-rate system which combined one or 
more exchange rates, import duties, export taxes 
and export subsidies in a coherent manner. 
The gravity of the debt situation further 
underlined for the new pragmatism the impor-
tance of saving and earning as much foreign 
exchange as could efficiently be done. However, 
efficiency would need to be assessed in "macro-
economic" terms, i.e., on the basis of shadow 
rather than market prices. 
On the control of inflation, the new pragma-
tism took into account that a substantial fraction 
of product prices and factor returns were formed 
in markets that did not conform to the standards 
of perfect competition. The existence of a large 
informal sector of the economy was held to lead 
to levels of labour income constrained by the 
need to share poverty. Such a situation implied, 
at best, labour incomes set by monopolistic com-
petition in the (informal) product markets. For-
mal sector wages, in turn, were recognized to be 
governed by legislation and union/enterprise 
bargaining. Hence, these wages were not set by 
competitive markets either. In turn, the mono-
polistically competitive and oligopolistic nature 
of product markets allowed mark-up pricing and 
non-competitive returns to investment in most 
non-agricultural activities. Two major conse-
quences resulted from these features. On the one 
hand, the existence of "administered" prices and 
incomes provided a pivot on which to base a 
prices and incomes policy, including temporary 
price and wage freezes as well as offsetting 
changes in nominal wages and interest rates. 
The second important implication arose for the 
evaluation of efficiency in production. With fac-
tor incomes not determined competitively, pri-
vate profitability of production is no longer a 
good measure of national economic efficiency. 
The latter needs to be measured at shadow pri-
ces. It follows that tax and commercial policy 
should be set so as to bring private profitability 
and national economic benefit into equality. A 
proper underpinning for the differentiated fea-
tures of the import-export régime is thereby 
provided. 
The new pragmatism also recognized that 
response to policy would vary across the econ-
omy. In part, such differences would arise from 
non-uniformity of underlying conditions (e.g., 
some sectors would have plentiful excess capac-
ity, others would not); other differences would 
result from the distribution of decision-makers 
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across sectors (some would be tight oligopolies 
of a handful of firms while others would be 
relatively competitive). Throughout, the new 
policy view attempted to gear macroeconomic 
policy to take advantage of these differences by 
looking for high-response-elasticity sectors and 
tailoring policy accordingly. 
Finally, the new pragmatism had a much 
more sophisticated view of expectations. Rather 
than assuming that economic agents directly 
extrapolated the past (adaptive expectations) or 
that they truly knew how the economic system 
operated or at least acted as though they did 
("rational" expectations), the new pragmatism 
started from the recognition that the key eco-
nomic agents were relatively few in number and 
that their expectations (and actions) could be 
critically affected by enlisting them in the imple-
mentation of the economic policy. The old cen-
tral banking technique of "moral suasion" was 
thus combined with the principles of indicative 
planning to yield a policy tool which could sup-
port short-term stabilization policy. 
The new pragmatism was the intellectual 
source for the stabilization policies of Brazil 
(Plan Cruzado), Argentina (Plan Amiral), Peru, 
Venezuela and Mexico; however, in none of 
these countries was the full package of the new 
pragmatism adopted. The feature most gener-
ally put into practice was the prices and incomes 
policy, ranging from outright freeze (by agree-
ment or by decree) through controlled slide. The 
least applied part of the package was activation 
through export promotion. However, without a 
rapid increase in exports, the lack of foreign 
exchange could not.help limiting the level of 
activity. In turn, without a rising GNP the 
incomes policy would perforce be subject to inor-
dinate distributional strains. Policy-makers 
around the hemisphere saw the problem and 
dealt with it by running down reserves (Brazil), 
limiting debt payments and running up arrears 
(Brazil, Peru, Argentina) or repeated external 
debt renegotiations (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, 
Venezuela). However, none of these efforts 
yielded more than a very temporary relaxation of 
the foreign exchange constraint. 
The recognition of sectoral differentiation of 
costs, market structure and control did not spill 
over into a generalized policy. Brazil, Venezuela 
and Peru adopted the most differentiated trade 
restriction systems. Venezuela's and Peru's 
broke down fairly rapidly under the combined 
weight of foreign exchange scarcity and wide 
differentials (which made corruption much 
more irresistible), while Brazil's survived thanks 
in good measure to being much more solidly 
established and of longer duration. 
Moreover, the new pragmatism did not offer 
a clear stand on public finance, on the general 
notion that activation would yield a fiscal divi-
dend, which could be used to cover a pre-existing 
deficit or could be used to expand government 
expenditure for worthy purposes. However, 
with activation hampered due to the lack of 
foreign exchange, the risks inherent in fiscal 
deficits loomed distinctly larger. 
The failure of the "heterodox" stabilization 
policies in Brazil, Argentina and Peru gave the 
new pragmatism a bad reputation and prompted 
wistful longing for the old monetarist simplicity. 
However, significant parts of new pragmatist 
thinking had become received wisdom as evi-
denced by the heterodox elements in President 
Menem's stabilization plan. Moreover, there 
was also extensive consensus in interpreting the 
new pragmatist experience in regard to the 
breakdown of administrative control systems. 
Combined with the fiscal deficit, this breakdown 
eventually led to a general conviction that the 
State was a very poor administrator capable of 
nothing other than the most elementary func-
tions. By contrast, Bolivia became the shining 
example: the stabilization of prices had been 
accompanied by simplification of taxes, whole-
sale dismantling of public enterprises, the instal-
lation of free markets, the reduction of import 
duties and high real interest rates. The Bolivian 
State had been trimmed down to size in an 
attempt to set the stage for growth. Mexico 
heeded the example and applied many of the 
same policies. But doubts survived: Bolivia 
appeared to have stabilized but it was also stag-
nating;2 in Mexico even price stability was not 
assured. 
2Official GNP estimates show growth of 2.8% for 1988, i.e., 
about as much as population grew. However, cognoscenti claim 
that all that has happened is that the statistics now pick up a range 
of informal activity that had been there all along; therefore, the 
true growth of GNP is alleged to be zero. 
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III 
Point and counterpoint circa 1990: a retrospective 
and prospective view 
Over the last four decades tension has continu-
ally existed between the policy needs of the real 
side of the economy, segmented sectorally, dif-
ferentiated with regard to costs of production, 
market structure, market adjustment mecha-
nisms, income distribution and response elastici-
ties, and the requirements of a unified and 
implementable macroeconomic policy. Over the 
decades, policy has swung back and forth, as 
intellectual fashion waxed and waned and politi-
cal enthusiasm and disillusion with easy-
sounding prescriptions alternated. 
Thus, the ebb and flow between the atten-
tion to sectoral differentiation and the emphasis 
on "implementable" undifferentiated macro-
policy has been a constant in the policy cycles of 
the hemisphere. Structuralism (read recognition 
of sectoral differentiation) did battle with the old 
monetarism (read aggregate simplicity). The 
latter won on points, but the former had a lasting 
impact on the economic landscape of the hemis-
phere. The result was the new monetarism, cog-
nizant of the existing sectoral needs but 
dedicated to eradicate them. The collapse of the 
new monetarism briefly re-established the 
hegemony of the old monetarism, but not for 
long. The new pragmatism appeared, attempt-
ing to legitimize sectoral differentiation within a 
coherent macroeconomic conception. However, 
running a highly differentiated policy, even if 
based on sophisticated concepts, turned out to be 
beyond the administrative capability of Latin 
American governments. Hence the pendulum 
haç very recently swung once more to "automatic 
mechanisms", i.e., to use of the free market in 
microeconomic matters and to a version of the 
old monetarism combined with official capital 
inflow at the macro level. 
While the sectoral fissures in the economic 
landscape of Latin America have become 
increasingly undeniable, the trend at present is 
once again to let the market rip, in the hope that 
whatever segmentations exist will thereby be 
made to go away. In part, this represents the 
view that it is largely the government itself that 
creates the segmentations and distortions; 
therefore, they will disappear as soon as the 
government gets out of the way. While this 
happy outcome is gestated, government should 
attempt to become really good at doing a few 
very central things (such as collecting taxes). 
No doubt the pendulum will eventually 
swing back. As it will become increasingly 
obvious after a few years that trimming back the 
government has not caused the fundamental dif-
ferentiations in the economy to disappear, 
because these are rooted in the development 
process itself and at bottom define the stage of 
development at which Latin America finds itself, 
policy will once again turn towards a more disag-
gregate mode. Then, perhaps, an even more 
pragmatic new pragmatism will emerge, one 
that incorporates limits on the administrative 
capacity of the State as a basic building block of 
policy choice, one that more clearly targets the 
priority areas which require State intervention, 
but does not give up aggregate balance in the 
process. 
Out of such a truly balanced pragmatism may 
come a transition policy which will eschew the 
economic surgery and the attendant social and 
economic costs that are at present argued to be 
unavoidable, and will instead allow Latin Ameri-
ca's economies to evolve towards an effectively 
working market system by growing out of its 
sectoral differentiations. 
Point and counterpoint will then have 
become resolved in a final accord. 
